Here is my cv.

Here is some recent work:

  • Referendums as Representative Democracy - (Hart 2024) (2025 Paperback)

    • In referendums on fundamental constitutional issues, do the people come together to make decisions instead of representatives? This book argues no. It offers an alternative theory of referendums whereby they are one of many ordinary ways that voters give direction to their representatives. In this way, the book argues that referendums are better understood as exercises in representative democracy.

      The book challenges the current treatment of referendums in processes of constitutional change both in the UK and around the world. It argues that referendums have been used under the banner of popular sovereignty in a way that undermines representative institutions. This book makes the case for the use of referendums stronger by showing how they can support, rather than undermine, institutions of representative democracy.

      Understanding referendums as exercises in representative democracy has broader implications for constitutional democracy as well. Rather than see the power to constitute constitutions as something that happens occasionally in exceptional moments through referendums, this book argues instead that voters constantly have the power to constitute and reconstitute their constitutions.

    • Response to Critics - (2026) 3(2) Comparative Constitutional Studies 371-377

  • ‘Judicial Review, Ouster Clauses, and the Democratic Credentials of the Judiciary in the United Kingdom’ - (2025) 45(2) Legal Studies 231-245

    • The aim of this paper is to challenge the argument that says, as judges are not elected, they have weaker or no democratic legitimacy when compared to legislators. This paper draws on dicta from Laws LJ, as he then was, in the Divisional Court case of Cart v Upper Tribunal, to offer two reasons why this is false. Call these the efficacy and equality principles of representation. The claim here is that without an independent judiciary, legislators cannot legislate or legislate in a way that applies equally. So, without an independent judiciary, the democratic legitimacy of a legislature is weakened or disappears. This argument makes a legal difference, but the kind of legal difference it makes varies between jurisdictions. This paper focuses on one difference the democratic legitimacy of judges makes in the UK: the extent to which Parliament can oust judicial review for error of jurisdiction.

  • `The Science of Accountability: The Role of Reason-Giving When Deferring to Scientific Assessments in Judicial Review’ - (2025) 30(1) Judicial Review 55–71.

    • Scientific assessments regularly inform decisions taken by public authorities in the UK. Scientific assessments are necessary for sound decision-making, but raise questions for scientists and administrative lawyers. Scientific assessments raise questions for scientists because, as scientists themselves readily admit, their assessments are contested and uncertain. Scientific assessments raise challenges for administrative lawyers because while judges are not well-placed to consider the merits of scientific assessments, these assessments may nevertheless be central to answering questions of Wednesbury unreasonableness. Further, as Blundell helpfully explains, the use of evidence is different in judicial review from other forms of High Court litigation. The purpose of judicial review is to check that public bodies are acting lawfully, not to provide a forum for a ‘battle of experts’. This article argues that when determining the appropriate degree of deference to the use of scientific assessments by public bodies, insufficient weight has been given to the reasons provided by the public body for relying on, or departing from, scientific assessments. Reason-giving requirements are present in cases with statutory consultees, and this article argues for expanding this reason-giving approach more widely to cases regarding the use of scientific assessments in general.

  • ‘Public Functions of Political Parties’ - (2025) 88 Modern Law Review 660-688

    • Political parties are both private and public bodies. Some actions of political parties must be categorised as private to protect freedom of speech and association. This article argues, however, that it is sometimes necessary that political parties are understood as exercising public functions as well. When parties are exercising public functions, their actions then may be subject to judicial review. Currently, political parties have not been held to exercise public functions in the UK either for purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 or common law judicial review. This article challenges the approach in UK law, particularly in Tortoise Media v Conservative Party [2023], which held that it was not even arguable that the selection of a Prime Minister by a political party was a public function. This article challenges this finding by offering a framework, drawn from current case law, for establishing when political parties are exercising public functions. The case law says that functions are public when bodies are ‘operating as an integral part of a governmental framework’. These conditions were more than satisfied in Tortoise Media and offer a firm – albeit limited and context-contingent – basis for judicial review of actions by political parties.